EDU-012 — Classes and education relationships

Status: implemented
Type: bounded vertical capability
Phase: 4
Decision: Education owns tenant-local classes and student/teacher relationships to existing Member identities. System RBAC remains the action-authorization boundary; class roles never become System roles. No platform tenant-ignore endpoint or supervision model is introduced in this slice.

Tenant-admin outcome

Tenant administrators manage classes, student education relationships, invitations, and supervision within explicit tenant and row-level scopes while Member/System remain the owners of generic users and roles.

Scope

Education class entity and membership relationships.
Student/teacher/class domain roles without duplicating System RBAC.
Invitations and duplicate-safe acceptance.
Education profile extensions.
Supervision relationships and data scopes if retained.
Audit and operation logging.

Delivered contract

V4140 creates education_class, education_class_member, education_class_invitation, and append-only invitation audit.
Both students and teachers are existing tenant-scoped Member users validated through MemberUserApi; Education stores only IDs and domain roles.
Management permissions are independent: education:class:create, education:class:query, education:class-member:query, and education:class-invitation:create. Permissions are provisioned separately by System RBAC and are not represented in class relationships.
All aggregate tenant IDs come from TenantContextHolder; tenant-qualified mapper predicates and PostgreSQL triggers reject cross-tenant relationships.
Invitation creation is idempotent per tenant, actor, and key with request-hash conflict detection. Acceptance locks the invitation, checks invitee and expiry, and writes relationship plus audit in one transaction.
This bounded slice intentionally excludes account creation, password handling, platform tenant-ignore operations, education profile duplication, and supervision relationships.

Acceptance criteria

Generic account, password, token, tenant, and role tables are not duplicated.
Student/teacher/class permission matrix is documented and tested.
Cross-class and cross-tenant access is denied.
Invitation acceptance is idempotent and auditable.
Platform-admin tenant-ignore operations are explicit and permission guarded (none are exposed by this bounded capability).
Database changes use flyway-postgresql.

Risk and rollback

Risk: High authorization and relationship-integrity risk.
Rollback: Disable management endpoints and correct relationships through audited forward operations.

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