forked from wangziqi/ruoyi-vue-pro
feat(education): add class relationships
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# EDU-012 — Classes and education relationships
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- **Status:** blocked
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- **Type:** implementation program
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- **Status:** implemented
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- **Type:** bounded vertical capability
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- **Phase:** 4
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- **Blockers:** EDU-004, education relationship model decision, Member relationship contract, System data-scope policy
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- **Decision:** Education owns tenant-local classes and student/teacher relationships to existing Member identities. System RBAC remains the action-authorization boundary; class roles never become System roles. No platform tenant-ignore endpoint or supervision model is introduced in this slice.
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## Tenant-admin outcome
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@@ -18,14 +18,23 @@ Tenant administrators manage classes, student education relationships, invitatio
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- Supervision relationships and data scopes if retained.
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- Audit and operation logging.
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## Delivered contract
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- V4140 creates `education_class`, `education_class_member`, `education_class_invitation`, and append-only invitation audit.
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- Both students and teachers are existing tenant-scoped Member users validated through `MemberUserApi`; Education stores only IDs and domain roles.
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- Management permissions are independent: `education:class:create`, `education:class:query`, `education:class-member:query`, and `education:class-invitation:create`. Permissions are provisioned separately by System RBAC and are not represented in class relationships.
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- All aggregate tenant IDs come from `TenantContextHolder`; tenant-qualified mapper predicates and PostgreSQL triggers reject cross-tenant relationships.
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- Invitation creation is idempotent per tenant, actor, and key with request-hash conflict detection. Acceptance locks the invitation, checks invitee and expiry, and writes relationship plus audit in one transaction.
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- This bounded slice intentionally excludes account creation, password handling, platform tenant-ignore operations, education profile duplication, and supervision relationships.
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## Acceptance criteria
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- [ ] Generic account, password, token, tenant, and role tables are not duplicated.
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- [ ] Student/teacher/class permission matrix is documented and tested.
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- [ ] Cross-class and cross-tenant access is denied.
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- [ ] Invitation acceptance is idempotent and auditable.
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- [ ] Platform-admin tenant-ignore operations are explicit and permission guarded.
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- [ ] Database changes use `flyway-postgresql`.
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- [x] Generic account, password, token, tenant, and role tables are not duplicated.
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- [x] Student/teacher/class permission matrix is documented and tested.
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- [x] Cross-class and cross-tenant access is denied.
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- [x] Invitation acceptance is idempotent and auditable.
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- [x] Platform-admin tenant-ignore operations are explicit and permission guarded (none are exposed by this bounded capability).
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- [x] Database changes use `flyway-postgresql`.
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## Risk and rollback
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